
In its judgment of 7 October 2026 in case 2026 Heo 10049, Korea’s Patent Court examined the distinctiveness of a Korean word mark combining the surname Gye with “dermatology clinic.” The question was whether patients could identify a particular provider, rather than merely understand the type of service. The rarity of the surname and the mark’s actual use mattered alongside its wording.
The registration and the invalidation challenge
The mark, rendered here as “Gye Dermatology Clinic,” was filed on 10 February 2020 and registered on 30 January 2024 as No. 40-2147591 for dermatology services in Class 44. Its designated services formed part of the assessment.

The challenger argued that a single-syllable surname followed by a generic service description lacked distinctiveness. Exclusive registration, it said, would also restrict other people bearing the surname Gye.
An invalidation petition was filed on 29 March 2024. The Intellectual Property Trial and Appeal Board (IPTAB) rejected it on 30 December 2025 in case 2024 Dang 959. The challenger then sought annulment of that decision.
A recognizable surname is not necessarily a common surname
Article 33(1)(5) of Korea’s Trademark Act concerns a common surname or name represented in an ordinary manner. Commonness is assessed at the relevant decision date by reference to domestic consumers’ and traders’ actual circumstances and perceptions.
Recognition of Gye as a surname did not establish that it was common. The 2015 census recorded 6,636 people bearing the surname among 49,705,663 residents: about 0.0134%, or 13–14 people per 100,000.
The existence of some well-known people with that surname did not establish a contrary consumer perception. The court therefore rejected this invalidity ground.
A short mark must still be commonplace to fall within Article 33(1)(6)
Article 33(1)(6) requires a sign to be both simple and commonplace. A surname written with one Korean syllable does not, by that fact alone, satisfy both requirements.
As of December 2023, only two of 77,139 medical institutions used the same clinic name: the challenger’s family clinic and the defendant’s clinic. From around 1961 until 2021, the defendant and its predecessor had used the name alone for roughly sixty years.
The court found the sign was not commonplace and did not need to decide separately whether it was simple. The result did not depend on elaborate graphic design.
Longstanding use can inform the ordinary distinctiveness inquiry
The challenger maintained that a lengthy history of use belonged only in an Article 33(2) inquiry into acquired distinctiveness: whether use had caused consumers to recognize a particular commercial source.
The court considered actual market use relevant to Article 33(1)(6) as well. A sign’s real prevalence cannot be assessed solely by dissecting the words on paper.
This reasoning should not be recast as a separate finding that the mark had acquired distinctiveness under Article 33(2). The point was the role of use evidence in assessing the asserted Article 33(1) ground.
The clinic name could identify a particular service provider
Article 33(1)(7) addresses remaining cases of inability to distinguish commercial source, including relevant public-interest considerations. “Dermatology clinic” described the service, but Gye was a rare surname whose various meanings did not directly or indirectly describe the nature, quality or efficacy of dermatology services.
Surname-plus-specialty names are familiar, but that naming pattern does not make every individual name nondistinctive. Meaning, frequency, designated services and actual use must be examined together.
The rule limiting a physician to operating one clinic did not confine the clinic’s reputation or patient reach to a particular locality. It therefore did not support the challenger’s argument.
Registration validity and another clinic’s use remain distinct questions
None of the grounds under Article 33(1)(5), (6) or (7) succeeded. The court dismissed the annulment claim and left the IPTAB decision in place. It did not decide whether any particular other clinic’s use infringed or gave rise to damages.
Article 90(1)(1), concerning use of one’s own name or trade name in accordance with commercial practices, may limit a trademark’s effects. That issue does not replace the registration criteria in Article 33.
The judgment neither grants a monopoly over Gye in every field nor permits every use by anyone sharing the surname. The registered sign, designated services and actual manner of use remain important.
Evidence for assessing a surname-based clinic mark
A useful record addresses surname perception, actual use of the same name, duration of use and the services involved. Merely separating the surname from the service description misses part of the inquiry.
Registration or refusal of another clinic name does not automatically determine this case. Rarity, limited competing use and historical use operated together; the judgment establishes neither that every rare surname is registrable nor that every surname-plus-specialty mark must fail.
The practical distinction is between a familiar naming formula and a commonplace name. What matters is whether the particular sign can identify the source of the services in its actual setting.
The original figure labels and forms are preserved; the text explains the source material.
